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The purpose of this report is to uncover the factors behind what has been, on average, a 
strong productivity performance from the Canadian gold mining industry over the past 
four decades.  It is found that real price movements have had a substantial impact on 
productivity growth in the gold mining industry in Canada.  The real price of gold 
declined steadily throughout the 1990s, squeezing the profits of mines on sites of 
marginal quality and thereby leading to the closure of the least productive gold mines.  
This had the effect of increasing the average productivity of the overall industry.  The 
report also finds evidence that the gold mining industry in Canada was not in good health 
towards the end of the 1970s, despite the record gold prices of this period.  Real gold 
mining output decreased sharply and steadily throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite 
massive capital accumulation.  This situation was reversed in the 1980s, with new 
discoveries of gold, and strong productivity growth driven by technological and 
organizational improvements.  As these observations suggest, the productivity 
performance of the Canadian gold mining industry has been markedly different from 
decade to decade.  The 1960s and 1970s witnessed productivity stagnation followed by 
sharp declines, but the 1980s and 1990s saw gold mining productivity growth exceeding 
that at the total economy level by a wide margin.  Overall, the productivity gains of the 
past two decades have more than offset the earlier poor performance, so that the average 
productivity record of the gold mining industry over the past four decades remains strong. v 




In December 2002, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) 
delivered to Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) an overview report entitled 
“Productivity Trends in Natural Resource Industries in Canada.”  This report examined 
trends and drivers or determinants of labour, capital, and total factor productivity for all 
20 natural resource industries in Canada over the 1961-2000 period.  In February and 
March of 2004, CSLS prepared for NRCan in-depth analyses of the drivers of labour 
productivity growth for a subset of these industries, consisting of nine selected natural 
resource industries (coal mining, gold mining, diamond mining, electricity generation, oil 
and gas, logging and forestry, wood products, paper products, and earth sciences).  This 
report is the result of the analysis undertaken for the gold mining industry. 
 
The report includes a review of the literature on gold mining productivity.  One of 
the most important observations from the literature review is that metal mining industries 
are highly innovative, especially when account is taken of the process innovations 
absorbed through equipment from innovative suppliers.  Further, there are many 
indications that this technological progress is very important for labour productivity 
growth.  The organization of work is found to have an impact on productivity growth in 
metal mining; and to this can be added the possible negative effects on productivity of 
poor labour-management relations and adjustment to new regulations discussed in the 
literature for the coal mining industry.  The effect of output price on average productivity 
through encouraging or discouraging operations on lower-productivity sites is mentioned 
by several studies but is not highlighted by these studies as a primary determinant of 
productivity. 
 
In studying these productivity drivers for the case of the Canadian gold mining 
industry, the report first reviews the salient characteristics of the industry.  Some 
interesting observations are the following: 
 
·  the gold mining industry accounted for 0.15 per cent of total economy output in 
Canada in 2000, and 0.05 per cent of employment; 
 
·  in 2001 there were 35 gold mines in Canada, down from 70 in 1989, and 
distributed across six provinces and the three territories; 
 
·  in 2000, Canada was the fourth largest producer of gold in the world with about 
5.8 per cent of world production; 
 
·  despite having the image of an old-fashioned industry, the mining industry in 
Canada is actually among the largest users of advanced technologies; and 
 vi 
·  the real price of gold rose rapidly in the 1970s – due to demand pressures from 
speculative buying caused by the uncertainty associated with the oil price shocks 
– and declined more or less steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The labour productivity performance of the Canadian gold mining industry has 
varied markedly by decade.  In the 1960s output per hour growth was weak, despite 
strong increases in capital intensity.  In the 1970s labour productivity declined sharply, 
but the 1980s and 1990s saw a strong output per hour growth performance.  The level of 
output per hour in the Canadian gold mining industry was above that of the total 
economy for the entire 1961-2000 period, but exceeded the total economy average to a 
much larger degree in 2000 than in the 1960s and 1970s, owing to the strong productivity 
growth of the 1980s and 1990s.  The level of output per hour in the Canadian gold mining 
industry in 2000 was slightly higher than that in the U.S. gold mining industry. 
 
The report applies a simple growth accounting framework to attempt to identify 
the drivers of output per hour growth in the Canadian gold mining industry in each of 
these periods.  Capital intensity growth is found to have been an important driver of 
labour productivity in the 1960s and slightly less so again in the 1990s, but the 
impressive output per hour growth in the 1980s was driven primarily by total factor 
productivity growth.  The report makes the following findings, based on the literature 
review and trends in more specific factors affecting productivity growth. 
 
·  1960s: rapid growth in capital intensity but declining output and only weak labour 
productivity growth, due to declining ore grades. 
 
·  1970s: a large increase in the real price of gold encouraged the mining of poor 
quality sites, leading to large declines in labour productivity – but the continued 
declines in output suggest that as much gold as possible was being extracted from 
existing operations, and perhaps that the high prices saved the industry from 
collapse. 
 
·  1980s: an abrupt rebound to solid labour productivity growth, due to new 
discoveries of richer and more accessible deposits, reinforced by technological 
and organizational improvements. 
 
·  1990s: weak productivity growth in the first half of the decade followed by very 
strong growth thereafter.  Capital intensity growth became important once again 
after stagnation in the 1980s, a steady decline in the real price of gold continued 
to pressure low-productivity mines to close, and more importantly, most aspects 
of mining – from site design to extraction to the on-site transportation of materials 
– became computerized. 
 Productivity Trends in the Gold Mining Industry in Canada 
 
  In December 2002, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) 
delivered to Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) an overview report entitled 
“Productivity Trends in Natural Resource Industries in Canada” (CSLS, 2003).  This 
report examined trends and drivers or determinants of labour, capital, and total factor 
productivity for all 20 natural resource industries in Canada over the 1961-2000 period.  
In February and March of 2004, CSLS prepared for NRCan in-depth analyses of the 
drivers of labour productivity growth for a subset of these industries, consisting of nine 
selected natural resource industries (coal mining, gold mining, diamond mining, 
electricity generation, oil and gas, logging and forestry, wood products, paper products, 
and earth sciences).  A summary of these analyses is found in CSLS (2004).  The present 
report is the result of the analysis undertaken for the gold mining industry.
1 
 
  The report is divided into four sections plus a conclusion.  The first section 
presents a review of the literature on productivity and its determinants in gold and other 
metal mining industries.  The second section presents detailed observations on the salient 
characteristics of the Canadian gold mining industry.  The third section presents data on 
labour, capital and total factor productivity growth and levels in the Canadian gold 
mining industry.  The fourth section focuses on labour productivity, and attempts to 
identify the factors explaining the labour productivity growth performance of the 
Canadian gold mining industry over the past four decades. 
 
 
I.  Literature Review of Studies on Productivity in the Gold and 
Other Metal Mining Industries 
 
This section reviews the literature to attempt to uncover the factors behind what 
has been, on average, a strong productivity performance from the Canadian gold mining 
industry over the past four decades.  Unfortunately, there are very few studies on 
productivity in gold mining specifically.  Attention has focused instead on other metal 
mining industries, such as copper and iron ore, probably because these are more 
important industries than gold in the United States, where much of the research has been 
undertaken.  In most cases though, the gold mining industry resembles these other metal 
mining industries to an extent such that conclusions are likely to be directly applicable to 
the gold mining industry.  Also, some important factors identified in the literature review 
on coal mining productivity in Smith (2004) are relevant for metal mining as well.  
Therefore, for some issues such as labour-management relations that are addressed by the 
coal literature but not by the metal mining literature, it is possible to draw lessons from 
the coal experience for the mining industry as a whole. 
                                                 
1 CSLS would like to thank NRCan for financial support to undertake this research.  The author would like 
to thank NRCan officials for comments on earlier drafts and Andrew Sharpe for comments and guidance.  
Comments can be directed to the author at jeremy.smith@csls.ca.  The reports on coal mining (Smith, 
2004) and diamond mining are available as CSLS Research Reports 2004-07 and 2004-09 respectively at 
www.csls.ca under Publications and Research Reports, and the reports on the remaining six industries are 
available upon request from info@csls.ca.   2 
 
A.  Early Studies on Canadian Metal Mining Productivity 
 
  Stollery (1985) estimates total factor productivity growth rates through a 
parametric cost function approach and discusses their determinants for the following 
Canadian mining industries for the 1957-1979 period: asbestos, aggregated non-metal 
mining, copper, gold, silver, nickel, iron, aggregated metal mining, and aggregated 
mining.  He finds the major determinants to be more or less equally important across 
these industries.  The time period of this analysis includes a high-productivity growth 
period in the 1960s followed by a sharp drop in growth rates, indeed becoming negative 
for many industries, in the 1970s. 
 
  Stollery (1985) finds that rapidly increasing capital intensity was coincident with 
large increases in the scale of operations in all mining industries considered in the 1960s, 
hence setting the stage for productivity rewards from realizing increasing returns to scale 
(consistent with the theoretical predictions of Boyd (1987) for coal mining, as discussed 
by Smith (2004)).  He finds that the productivity slowdown in the 1970s was caused in 
large part by a contraction in output, i.e. the increase in the scale of operations in the 
1960s was reversed.  He also finds large negative effects on productivity growth from 
higher energy prices (caused by the oil price shocks of the 1970s) and declining quality 
of the ores being mined.  The effect of energy prices is substantial due to the fact that the 
increasing scale in the 1960s entailed high capital investments – which generally 
consisted of machinery requiring large fuel expenditures – and so a shift from labour to 
capital. 
 
  Although Stollery does not draw the link, several of these observations are 
interrelated.  A broad range of natural resource commodities saw real price increases in 
the 1970s, although such increases were most pronounced for coal, which became a 
partial substitute for oil, and for gold and silver, which attracted speculative buying in 
this period caused by uncertainty associated with the oil price shocks.  These higher 
prices made potential smaller mines on sites with lower quality deposits profitable 
enough to enter into operation, even though a part of this increased profitability was 
being offset by higher fuel expenses.  This in turn decreased average ore grade and 
output, which acted to reduce productivity growth. 
 
  The method employed by Stollery (1985) to estimate TFP growth allows for the 
quantification of a residual effect that is not accounted for by the specific cost function 
specification.  He finds this residual effect to be somewhat important in explaining TFP 
growth for the aggregate mining industry, and makes a number of speculations as to what 
this residual might be picking up.  First, he raises the possibility of a slowdown in 
technological innovation in the 1970s, and quotes Richardson (1976) as indicating 
insufficient research and development expenditure in mining supply industries (i.e. those 
designing the machinery and equipment for actual mining operations).  Second, he states 
that increased environmental and safety regulations imposed in the 1970s, along with 
unspecified tax disincentives, probably reduced investment in mining, citing some 
findings of Smithson et al. (1977).  This lower investment, he states, may have indirectly   3 
reduced productivity growth through decreasing access to new technologies and thereby 
slowing the rate of innovation. 
 
  Despite the vintage of the Stollery study, as well as its particular focus on the 
productivity slowdown in the 1970s, several relevant lessons can still be drawn for 
productivity growth in gold mining, and more generally in metal mining and all mining 
industries.  Chief among these are the role of operations on sites with poor ore grades in 
lowering the average productivity of the overall industry; and the possibility of increasing 
productivity growth through larger operations that realize the benefits of increasing 
returns to scale.  Also, adoption of new technologies, especially those embodied in new 
capital, appear to be important drivers of productivity growth as well, although Stollery 
(1985) is not able to show this directly. 
 
  Green and Green (1987) provide a study of productivity determinants in the metal 
mining industries in Ontario for the 1975-1985 period, with coverage for the 1960-1977 
period available in an earlier report (Green and Green, 1985).  The analysis is generally 
broken down into gold mining, iron mining and other metal mining, but the results are 
largely uniform.  Although Green and Green (1987) make no mention of Stollery (1985), 
their results provide a useful way to broaden Stollery’s conclusions, which focus on the 
exceptional decade of the 1970s.  Green and Green (1985) find the same steep labour 
productivity declines in Ontario metal mining as Stollery observes for Canadian metal 
mining in the 1970s, but Green and Green (1987) note evidence of the beginning of a 
recovery in the early 1980s. 
 
  Green and Green (1987) note the same reductions in the scale of operations and 
capital accumulation during the 1970s as Stollery (1985), but identify an additional cause 
of the productivity slowdown in metal mining in that decade.  This is the failure of mines 
to reduce the number of non-production workers (referred to as white collar workers, i.e. 
administrative and managerial workers) during periods of output declines.  This, they 
state, is evidence that skill-specific workers are a quasi-fixed input.  They conclude that 
the productivity declines of the 1970s were in part caused by the inability to adjust the 
workforce to operations on a smaller scale. 
 
  By the early 1980s, however, Green and Green (1987) find that capital 
accumulation in metal mining had resumed and that the employment of white collar 
workers had become more flexible.  However, demand for raw materials such as metals 
was judged to be limited in that period, causing continued reliance on smaller operations 
and so keeping productivity growth low.  The authors suggest that rising capital 
accumulation in the face of low demand is in fact evidence of an expected boom in 
demand for raw commodities, and so that the rebound in capital accumulation in metal 
mining in the 1980s would eventually lead to expanding output and a resumption of the 
strong productivity growth of the pre-1970s period. 
 
  Beyond increased flexibility in adjusting the workforce to the presiding demand 
conditions, the authors judge the continued adoption of new technologies through capital 
investment to be important for success in terms of productivity growth.  It should also be   4 
noted that their prediction of a rebound in output and productivity growth later in the 
1980s turned out to be correct, especially for gold, as will be seen in the section 
discussing the productivity performance of the Canadian gold mining industry in the third 
section of this report. 
 
B.  Innovation and Canadian Metal Mining Productivity 
 
  These early studies on metal mining in Canada clearly recognize the importance 
of technology in productivity growth.  They mainly focus on innovation as embedded in 
new machinery and equipment.  A more recent and comprehensive examination of 
innovation in metal mining, based on the Statistics Canada 1999 Survey of Innovation, is 
provided by Schaan (2002).  She reports that metal mines tend to innovate more in 
process than in product terms.  She also finds that there is a smaller proportion of 
innovative firms in metal mining industries specifically as compared to manufacturing 
industries, but notes that in an overall system approach to analyzing innovation, part of 
manufacturing’s innovative activity passes through to metal mining industries through the 
supply of equipment (i.e. embodied technical progress). 
 
Two further points should be made about this study.  First, it is not surprising that 
metal mining firms are not large product innovators, since their output is generally 
demanded in raw form and so does not require innovations in presentation or content.  
Second, the data available do not lend themselves to an entirely suitable system approach 
to metal mining innovation, since no data are available on innovation in construction 
industries.  Site development and exploration in mining are included in the engineering 
component of the capital stock, and innovations in this area have a potentially large-scale 
impact on mining processes. 
 
Overall, then, this report suggests, that the Canadian metal mining industry is 
highly innovative, both in terms of employing the newest technologies in capital 
investments, and in using new technologies to improve mining techniques.  Global 
Economics (2001) makes similar observations for Canadian mining in general.  Given the 
global competitive pressure to contain costs, it is not entirely surprising that mining 
industries are eager to adopt cost-saving innovations. 
 
Two specific examples provide further support for the conclusion that metal 
mining is a highly innovative industry.  Singhal, Collins and Fytas (1995) discuss the 
increase in the use of computers for improving the productivity of on-site transportation 
through automatic dispatching, and improving productivity in general through 
scheduling, data logging and precision planning.  Another process innovation they 
discuss is the substitution towards conveyors and away from trucks for the transportation 
of ore. 
 
Morrison (1996) also mentions this movement to belt conveyance systems, and 
discusses the increased precision and effectiveness of new equipment, for example 
robotic machinery with sensors allowing remote control, in hardrock metal mining.  He 
predicts a major shift towards smaller access drifts for deep hardrock mining, improving   5 
productivity through more precise control, and improving worker safety both through 
allowing operators to maintain distance in dangerous situations and increasing structural 
stability of the overall pit. 
 
A further study, by Fred Kissell (2000) of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, should be 
mentioned in the context of mining innovation.  This study looks at past technology 
policies of the Bureau of Mines in order to discover the circumstances that surrounded 
their success or failure in terms of effective adoption by the mining industry.  While 
technology and innovation have been identified as key driving factors of productivity in 
mining industries, this study stresses the importance of appropriateness of technologies 
and the timing of their implementation in conjunction with the acquisition of the 
necessary complementary skills.  It identifies five factors that were essential for the 
eventual adoption by mines of technologies suggested by the Bureau. 
 
·  The first factor is pressure, as in the amount of pressure faced by mines from 
other sources to make improvements in a given area.  For example, the Bureau of 
Mines had done research in the 1960s into the benefits of illumination systems for 
underground mines and of monitoring systems for air quality, but mines did not 
adopt these technologies until safety regulations required them to do so. 
 
·  The second factor is the avoidance of pitfalls that seem obvious in hindsight.  For 
example, the Bureau had recommended advanced in-mine communication 
systems as early as the 1970s, but widespread use did not develop because the 
Bureau failed to foresee that specific training and servicing was required for any 
meaningful benefits to be derived. 
 
·  The third factor is the specific path of technology adoption, or more accurately the 
delay between the announcement of a new technology and its availability.  The 
Bureau found that when a suggested technology was a process innovation that 
involved only the description and perhaps demonstration of a new technique, 
adoption rates were higher than if a specific product had to be ordered from a 
manufacturer, perhaps involving customization, followed by required training in 
its use. 
 
·  The last two factors are financial in nature, namely the price of the innovation and 
the impact on mine profits.  Obviously the higher the initial cost of 
implementation and the more limited the probable benefits, the lower is the 
penetration of a given innovation. 
 
C.  Studies on Gold and Metal Mining Productivity in Australia 
 
One of the few studies focusing solely and specifically on the gold mining 
industry is Shebeb (2002), for Australia for the period 1968-1995.  This study is primarily 
concerned with the effects of capital accumulation and technological change on total 
factor productivity growth.  The rationale for including capacity utilization in the analysis 
is that periods of weak demand for gold lead to the idling of some capital assets.    6 
Therefore, during these periods, productivity measures using the entire capital stock will 
underestimate the true level of productivity.  Shebeb (2002) finds, however, that 
controlling for capacity utilization has very little impact on TFP growth in Australian 
gold mining.  In contrast, the author finds strong support for the proposition that a decline 
in the rate of technological change contributed to slower TFP growth, especially in the 
1990s.  Shebeb (2002) finds that Australian gold mines have had to rely on continuously 
deeper operations with higher costs for extracting lower quality ores.  This has lead to a 
small number of very large operations, but a reluctance to innovate due to fears that 
increased capital costs will lead to further erosion in international competitiveness. 
 
Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan (2003) present another study on Australia, 
focusing on output and labour productivity growth in gold, copper and iron ore mining, 
and also in coal mining and oil and gas extraction, for the 1968-1995 period.  Their 
results, fairly uniform across the three metal mining industries, show that output was 
largely input-driven in all periods, or equivalently that labour productivity growth was 
driven by growth in capital intensity.  The authors are also able to decompose total factor 
productivity growth into scale, price, efficiency and technology components.  In contrast 
to Shebeb (2002), Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan (2003) find that slower TFP growth was 
more due to declines in efficiency than in technological progress.  The differing results 
are due to different models, and the fact that Shebeb’s (2002) measure of technology 




D.  Productivity in the U.S. Copper Mining Industry 
 
A series of studies on the U.S. copper industry may provide insights into 
important productivity drivers in the gold mining industry as well, given that the actual 
technologies and processes involved are comparable.  The first is by Aydin (1998), and 
attributes the labour productivity rebound in the U.S. copper mining industry in the 1980s 
to three factors.  First, the author finds evidence of a shift in production towards mines 
with high ore grades, i.e. the closure of low-productivity mines.  This effect, however, is 
overshadowed by the two others, namely increased capital intensity
3 and the realization 
of increasing returns to scale.  Aydin (1998) states that an increase in capital per working 
hour can increase both the scale of the operation and the rate of technical change through 
the adoption of new technologies.  He provides a case study of a particular mine and 
finds the computerization of mine control of specific importance. 
 
Tilton and Landsberg (1999) largely echo these findings, and in addition state that 
the large labour productivity gains in the 1980s in U.S. copper mining were most likely 
                                                 
2 As with Kulshreshtha and Parikh (2002) for Indian coal mining, efficiency here refers to the fuller 
utilization of available production resources, while technological progress refers to an improvement in the 
method in which these resources are applied. 
3 Aydin (1998) also mentions the importance of growth in energy per hour in addition to growth in capital 
per hour.  Given the fuel requirements of most machinery, it should be expected that energy intensity will 
be as important as capital intensity, since the latter would be mostly ineffective without the former.   7 
responsible for the survival of the industry.
4  Although the authors do not have detailed 
capital stock data to work with, they state that the largest impact on labour productivity in 
copper mining is more likely due to innovation, both embodied within the capital stock 
and coming about through the development of new processes.  They focus especially on 
the development of the solvent-extraction and electrowinning process, in-pit crushers and 
increased computer control.
5  Tilton and Landsberg (1999) state that these innovations 
certainly increased copper mining productivity in absolute terms, but that since new 
technological developments and machinery are available to all world copper producers, 
such innovations do not necessarily provide relative productivity gains compared to 
international competitors.  However, they find that in many cases – and certainly in the 
case of copper – there are two reasons for which absolute gains in productivity can also 
be reflected as productivity gains relative to international competitors.  There is a 
temporary advantage in being the first to adopt, since producers in other countries who 
have recently purchased the latest round of innovative products will be reluctant to 
innovate again immediately.  And there are more permanent advantages since products 
and processes are not necessarily equally suited to all mines in all countries. 
 
Aydin and Tilton (2000) and Garcia, Knights and Tilton (2001) make similar 
arguments, the latter also extending the analysis to copper mines in Chile.  Again, the 
effect on labour productivity of compositional shifts away from mines on sites with lower 
quality ores is found to be overshadowed by the effect of new technologies and 
innovation.  This holds for both countries, although to a slightly lesser degree in Chile, 
where the privatization of the copper mining industry has contributed to a large increase 
in the effort expended on identifying richer deposits.  Both studies argue that labour 
productivity growth is the key to regaining and maintaining comparative advantage in the 
international copper mining industry. 
 
Finally, Tilton (2001) finds that, in addition to its role in improving comparative 
advantage of the copper mining industry as a whole, labour productivity is crucial for the 
survival of individual mines during recessions (i.e. periods of weak demand and low 
prices for copper).  Studying a cross-section of U.S. copper mines over 1975-1990, the 
author finds that both high labour productivity levels at the beginning of a recession and 
the ability to raise labour productivity during a recession are important in averting mine 
closure, and that the latter is more important than the former.  Citing the studies just 
discussed, he states that this ability to increase labour productivity is driven by 
innovation.  But the fact that some mines fail during recessions suggests an inability to 
increase labour productivity, suggesting an inability to innovate.  Tilton (2001) attributes 
this to the lifetime of ore reserves of a particular mine.  Mines with a long expected life 
have an incentive to acquire expensive new technologies during a recession, with the 
                                                 
4 They state that the increase in efficiency was accompanied by some other events, such as increasing 
revenues from by-products of copper mining and the suspension of production in some African competitors 
due to civil strife, but that this increased efficiency was the main factor in saving the industry from 
collapse. 
5 The first is especially beneficial in terms of labour productivity since its application does not require 
further mining.  Waste ore that has already been extracted is exposed to an acid, which can then be 
processed into an electrolytic solution from which pure copper can be extruded.  The whole process is 
much less labour intensive than the actual hauling of the ore in the first place.   8 
expectation that the improved cost efficiency will help to weather the temporary low 
prices but will also have additional benefits in establishing cost advantages after the 
recession.  Firms with rapidly diminishing reserves, on the other hand, fail to innovate 
since the benefits expected to be conferred over the remaining lifetime of reserves will 
not sufficiently offset the cost of implementing the new technologies. 
 
E.  Productivity in the Iron Ore Mining Industry 
 
Iron mining in both Canada and the United States was also, like copper mining, 
close to collapse in the 1980s and also survived largely due to strong gains in labour 
productivity.  But these gains in iron mining, unlike the innovation-driven story for 
copper mining, were apparently not driven by technological improvements nor other 
traditional productivity drivers such as capital intensity.  Schmitz (2001) provides a 
detailed study of both the Canadian and U.S. iron ore mining industries, and finds that 
both were close to collapse after the steep reductions in steel production in the early part 
of that decade.  He states that labour productivity more or less doubled in the mining of 
iron ore in that decade, but provides a very detailed checklist of things that could not be 
driving this rebound. 
 
Although certain mines implemented rudimentary computer systems for 
dispatching, Schmitz finds that the scale of these changes was quite small in the period of 
the productivity growth acceleration, and that otherwise the technology of iron ore 
mining remained constant.  He also finds minimal contributions from changes in capital 
intensity, and reports that the closing of unproductive mines and concentration of 
production in mines with the richest deposits did not occur on a scale large enough to 
affect the average productivity level of the industry to any great degree. 
 
However, Schmitz finds convincing evidence that the impressive gains in iron ore 
mining labour productivity were driven by improved work effort and the efficiency of 
that effort.  In other words, an increase in the pace of work and an overhaul in the 
organization of that work were the key drivers of labour productivity.  These changes, 
Schmitz argues, were due primarily to the relaxation of rules restricting the tasks that 
workers could perform. 
 
Prior to the 1980s, each worker was given a specific task to perform in the overall 
mining operation, and there were strict rules, agreed upon by unions and management, 
forbidding the overlap of tasks.  That is, each worker performed a single task and was not 
permitted to perform any other task, even if the original task was already complete.  
Given the variance in effort among workers required to fulfill these tasks, this typically 
lead to periods of idleness, with workers waiting for their task to become necessary again. 
 
Near the beginning of the 1980s there were two changes to this structure, agreed 
upon by management and unions.  One allowed workers to perform numerous tasks, and 
the other, more specifically, allowed machine operators to engage in simple repairs of 
their equipment.  In turn, the pace of work increased as there were no longer periods of 
frictional idleness.  The author establishes the degree to which these changes were taken   9 
seriously by quoting union labour agreements.  Further, he states that the technology 
story discussed above for the copper industry is likely only partially correct.  Although 
the technological process was improved in copper mining unlike in iron ore mining, the 
same reforms to work rules took place in copper mines shortly after they were 
implemented in iron ore mines.  Therefore, these new work rules likely played a role in 
the improvement in copper mining productivity in the 1980s as well. 
 
Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2003) further observe that labour productivity 
gains in the 1980s in iron ore mining were not uniform.  That is, some regions of the 
United States experienced large gains while other regions experienced very small gains.  
They find that the regions with the highest productivity gains were those facing the most 
intense competition.  The authors find that steel production declined to a much larger 
degree in the eastern United States than in the west, and correspondingly find large 
labour productivity increases in iron ore mining in the east but virtually none in the west.  
Eastern producers, facing a much smaller local market, were forced to become much 
more productive so that their output would be competitively priced on world markets 
inclusive of high transport costs.  This does not necessarily contradict the argument of 
Schmitz (2001) that productivity gains were driven by changing work rules, although no 
evidence is presented to show that the rules were implemented to a larger degree or were 
taken more seriously in eastern iron ore mines compared to western mines. 
 
F.  Labour Relations, Regulation, and Unionization 
 
There are some brief lessons from the literature on coal mining productivity that 
apply to metal mining industries to a certain extent but that have not been taken up by the 
metal mining literature.  A more detailed discussion of these points is provided in Smith 
(2004), but they can be briefly addressed here. 
 
Naples (1998) closely examines the technical as well as social determinants of 
productivity in coal mining, and tests her hypotheses with data for 1955-1980.  She finds 
that some studies of the 1980s attributing the productivity declines in coal mining during 
the 1970s to stringent new safety regulations greatly exaggerate the role played by these 
regulations.  These studies, for example Denison (1985), fail to account for other drastic 
changes affecting the coal industry in the 1970s.  She mentions especially the rapidly 
deteriorating relations between managers and workers.  She finds that over two fifths of 
the productivity decline in the 1970s was due to social factors, but argues that, of this 
two-fifths share, the increased strike activity played a larger role than adaptation to the 
new safety regulations, since the increase in labour unrest was of a higher magnitude than 
the increase in spending associated with compliance. 
 
Chezum and Garen (1998) investigate the possible effect of unionization on 
productivity in the U.S. coal mining industry.  They point out that apparent positive 
relationships between productivity levels and unionization in coal mining are likely 
spurious, since unions tend to be exogenously more prevalent in mines that have 
favourable geological attributes.  The overall lesson that can be drawn from their work is 
that the effect of unionization on productivity in coal mining is likely very slight.   10 
 
G.  Summary 
 
One of the most important observations from the literature review is that metal 
mining industries are highly innovative, especially when account is taken of the process 
innovations absorbed through equipment from innovative suppliers.  Further, there are 
many indications that this technological progress is very important for labour 
productivity growth.  The organization of work is found to have an impact on 
productivity growth in metal mining; and to this can be added the possible negative 
effects on productivity of poor labour-management relations and adjustment to new 
regulations discussed in the coal mining literature.  The effect of output price on average 
productivity through encouraging or discouraging operations on lower-productivity sites 
is mentioned by several studies but is not highlighted by these studies as a primary 
determinant of productivity. 
 
 
II.  Characteristics of the Gold Mining Industry in Canada 
 
A.  Data Sources for Industry-Level Studies 
 
  The primary source of data for this report is the set of appendix tables provided 
with the CSLS (2003) report prepared for Natural Resources Canada on productivity 
trends in natural resources industries.  However, some series provided in those tables 
have been updated to reflect more recent data availability. 
 
  Most data presented in CSLS (2003) are from Statistics Canada’s Aggregate 
Productivity Measures (APM) program, classified according to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and available generally from 1961 through 1997.  The SIC has been 
superseded by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and the 
APM series have not yet become available for a long time period based on NAICS.
6  The 
general method has hence been to use the APM series for 1961-1997 and extend these 
series forward to 2002 using growth rates from alternative (generally NAICS-based) 
sources with more recent data available.
7  This results in the longest time series possible. 
 
  The APM real value added by industry series are expressed in 1992 constant 
dollars at factor cost, based on a fixed weighted Laspeyres index.  These have been 
                                                 
6 The Statistics Canada Productivity Program, in December 2003, released new estimates of labour 
statistics (jobs, hours worked and compensation) and labour productivity and related variables (output per 
hour, capital per hour, output per unit of capital stock and multifactor productivity) for selected business 
sector industries based on NAICS for the 1997-2002 period.  They have since been updated to 2003.  The 
Timeline Continuity Project aims to release these data for the 1961-2003 period sometime in the Fall of 
2004. 
7 A word of caution is in order considering data for 2001 and 2002 though.  2001 was a recession year, and 
2002 was a year of expansion in most industries but not a peak year, so including these years in growth rate 
calculations (which are generally calculated from business cycle peak to peak to achieve cyclical neutrality) 
will impart a cyclical bias.  The discussion in the following sections will hence focus only on the period up 
to 2000.  11 
updated from 1997 onwards with growth rates from GDP by Industry series, according to 




The APM hours worked and jobs series are based on data from the Labour Force 
Survey, with adjustments made from establishment-based surveys.  These have been 
updated from 1997 onwards with the new Productivity Program Database hours and jobs 
series, released on December 4, 2003.  These estimates are based on a similar 
methodology as the APM hours and jobs estimates, but are classified based on NAICS 
rather than the SIC. 
 
In contrast to the GDP, hours and employment series, the capital stock series have 
undergone major methodological changes at the same time as converting from SIC to 
NAICS.
9  Fortunately, however, the new series are available for the entire 1961-2002 
period based on the new methodology and NAICS, for detailed industries.  Hence, the 
method of extending the old series using growth rates from the new series for 1997-2002 
only has not been followed for capital stock.  Rather, the new series have been used for 
the entire period. 
 
Based on these updated output, hours and capital stock series discussed here, new 
series of labour productivity, capital productivity, total factor productivity and capital 
intensity have been calculated.  The labour productivity series are identical to those in 
CSLS (2003) for 1961-1997 but vary for the 1997-2000 period.  The series involving 
capital stock differ moderately from those in CSLS (2003) for the entire 1961-2000 
period due to the new capital stock methodology. 
 
As in CSLS (2003), the total factor productivity indexes are calculated with fixed 
1997 factor shares according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  In this production framework, if the strong assumption of short-run profit 
maximization is made, the elasticity of output with respect to the labour input (hours 
worked) is identical to the share of total output paid to labour.  The share of output paid 
to capital is then calculated residually as unity (the sum of the two shares with constant 
returns to scale) minus the labour share.  The labour share in 1997 is calculated by 
multiplying average weekly earnings (from the Survey of Employment, Payrolls and 
Hours) by employment and 52 weeks and dividing by current-dollar value added, all for 
                                                 
8 CSLS (2003) includes an appendix on the concordance of natural resources industries according to 
NAICS and according to SIC.  The gold mining industry under NAICS includes silver mining, while the 
SIC gold mining industry did not.  The effect of this difference is difficult to quantify, since output and 
employment data on the silver mining industry by itself are not available under either classification system.  
This suggests that the silver mining industry is the smaller of the two, and that the use of NAICS growth 
rates for 1997 onwards and NAICS capital stock over the entire period should not introduce an especially 
large degree of incomparability. 
9 Without presenting the details of these technical methodology updates, the motivation for the updates was 
a desire to present geometric-depreciated capital stock estimates on a methodologically equivalent basis as 
the United States.  The estimates generally show a higher level and lower growth than the estimates based 
on the old methodology and contained in CSLS (2003).  This is due to a uniform depreciation profile for a 
given investment cohort, in contrast to the division into sub-cohorts based on individual depreciation 
schedules that was used in the previous and less-preferred methodology (Statistics Canada, 2000).  12 
1997.  There are a number of problems with this approach, especially with assuming 
constant returns to scale in many industries and in assuming profit maximization in 
general.  The result of these problems is that the interpretation of TFP growth must be 
treated as very broad.  TFP growth in this framework can reflect technological progress, 
changes in any factors of production besides labour and capital (e.g. skills, energy), or 
violation of any of the assumptions.  It will hence be important in the coming sections to 
describe the various possible drivers of measured TFP growth in detail rather than simply 
ascribing changes in TFP to technological change. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are at least two other sources of 
productivity and related variables by industry in Canada.  The Productivity Program 
Database, from which data on hours and jobs for 1997-2002 are taken for the present 
analysis, also includes estimates of labour productivity, capital productivity, capital 
intensity and multifactor productivity for certain industries.  The unfortunate aspects of 
this dataset are that data are presently only available from 1997-2003, data are not 
released for some detailed industries due to data quality concerns, and data are only 
available in index form (i.e. growth rate analysis is possible but not level analysis).
10 
 
The Centre for the Study of Living Standards also maintains a productivity data 
base.  Data are available for about 230 detailed industries (all for which the underlying 
data are available), for Canada and all ten provinces.  Real value added data are from the 
GDP by Industry program, hours and employment are from the Labour Force Survey, and 
capital stock data are provided by the Capital Stocks Division.  Total factor productivity 
estimates are calculated according to the same methodology described above.  The data 
base is updated once or twice annually, with annual data available currently from 1987-
2003, according to NAICS.
11 
 
B.  Size, Regional Distribution, and Organization of the Gold Mining Industry in 
Canada 
 
  Gold mining accounted for 0.15 per cent of Canadian real output in 2000 – down 
from 0.64 per cent in 1961 – and around 20 per cent of that of the overall metal mining 
industry (CSLS, 2003:Table 28).
12  Real GDP in the gold industry was just over $1 
billion (1992 constant dollars at factor cost), compared to about $770 billion for the total 
economy.  Gold mining’s shares of total economy employment was lower than the real 
output share, at 0.05 per cent in 2000, having fallen from about 0.26 per cent in 1961.  
                                                 
10 As mentioned previously, the Timeline Continuity Project, expected to be completed sometime in the 
Fall of 2004, will extend these series back to 1961.  The series used in the present study correspond with 
those from the Productivity Program Database for 1997 onwards due to common data used in their 
construction.  It is not known how the present series will correspond with the Productivity Program series 
once data are available for 1961-1997, since the new data for this period will be based on NAICS. 
11 The estimates employed in this report differ slightly from those in the CSLS productivity data base, due 
to a different source for hours and employment data, but growth rates are broadly similar for the time 
period for which both sets of estimates are available.  In general, the Productivity Program Database/APM 
hours estimates are probably more comprehensive than the Labour Force Survey estimates, but the CSLS 
data base does not employ them since they are available to less industry detail. 
12 The data from CSLS (2003) have been updated throughout, as discussed above.  13 
About 7,400 of the 15.2 million Canadian jobs in 2000 were in gold mining, down from 
16,500 in 1961.  The evolution of gold mining’s output and employment contributions to 
the total economy are shown in Chart 1, and summary growth rates for gold mining are 




Table 1: Output, Employment, Hours and Capital Stock Growth in the Gold Mining 
Industry in Canada, 1961-2000, compound average annual growth rates, per cent 
  Real Value 
Added  Employment  Hours Worked  Capital Stock 
1961-2000  0.05  -2.03  -2.27  3.10 
1961-1973  -7.44  -8.25  -9.13  6.71 
1973-1981  -5.04  -1.28  -0.89  3.51 
1981-1989  17.33  10.89  11.27  2.57 
1989-2000  0.74  -4.36  -4.69  -0.63 
Source: CSLS (2003), with updates from GDP by Industry, the Labour Force Survey, and 
the Capital Stocks Division.  Figures for 1997 to 2000, and all figures for capital stock, 
are based on growth rates of the series corresponding to gold and silver mining.  It is not 
known how much of silver production was included in gold mining statistics before 1997. 
 
  There were 35 gold mines in Canada in 2001, down from 56 in 1997 and 70 in 
1989.
13  The number of gold mines in Canada was higher in the 1960s, but declined in the 
1970s, to 18 in 1978.  The number increased steadily throughout the 1980s, but has been 
declining once again since 1989.  These mine openings and closings over the entire 1961-
2001 period do not appear to be related to the price of gold, which increased strongly in 
                                                 
13 Data on the number of establishments are from surveys of mining industries carried out by Natural 
Resources Canada for Statistics Canada.  Data are disseminated via annual Statistics Canada publications 
(e.g. Metal Ore Mines, catalogue number 26-223) and CANSIM, Statistics Canada’s online data service 
(e.g. tables 152-0005 and 152-0002). 
 Chart 1: Share of the Gold Mining Industry in the Total 
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%  14 
the 1970s and has exhibited a slight downward trend since the 1980s (Chart 2).
14  
Alternatively, this entry and exit is more likely due to finds of new deposits, and 
profitability conditions in terms of the availability of new mining equipment and 
techniques. 
 
Chart 2: Number of Gold Mining Establishments and the 
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  The 35 mines in 2001 were distributed across six provinces and the three 
territories, but were concentrated in Ontario and Quebec.  There were 13 mines in 
Ontario, 10 in Quebec, three in British Columbia, two each in the Northwest Territories, 
Manitoba and Newfoundland, and one each in Nunavut, the Yukon Territories and 
Saskatchewan.   
 
Output and employment are more concentrated in Ontario than is the number of 
establishments, implying that Ontario’s gold mines are of larger scale than in other 
provinces.  This is confirmed for the limited number of provinces for which output and 
employment data are available.
15  Gold mines in Ontario had on average 243 employees 
per establishment in 2001, compared to 212 for British Columbia, 196 in Quebec and 199 
for all of Canada (including individual provinces for which data are not available). 
 
  In 2000, Canada was the fourth largest producer of gold in the world with about 
5.8 per cent of world production, after South Africa (16.6 per cent of world production), 
the United States (12.8 per cent) and Australia (11.5 per cent).  In the 1970s, Canada was 
the third largest producer, behind South Africa and Russia, but throughout the 1980s and 
1990s production in the United States and Australia climbed and production in Russia 
                                                 
14 However, Jen (2001) states that mine closures since 1997 are likely linked to more recent trends in the 
price of gold, which fell from about $384U.S. per ounce in 1994 to $271U.S. in 2001 (www.kitco.com).  
The price of gold rebounded to $310US in 2002 and has been rising steadily since then, but data are not yet 
available on mine openings and closures in 2002. 
15 Statistics Canada does not release output or employment data for the gold mining industry (derived from 
surveys of mining industries) for several provinces due to confidentiality concerns.  15 
tailed off.  Canada’s long-term share of world gold production has been between four and 
seven per cent (http://goldsheetlinks.com/production.htm). 
 
  Most gold mining in Canada appears to be undertaken by Canadian firms.  Very 
limited data on ownership are available without examining individual businesses.
16  
However, the data that are available show foreign ownership at only about 13 per cent of 
all Canadian gold mining enterprises in 1988.  This represents an increase from about 7 
per cent in 1980.  Indeed, Canada is regarded as a world leader in gold mining, with 
several Canadian companies operating and controlling mines in the United States, 
Mexico, Central America, South America, Greenland and other countries.
17 
 
C.  Resource Base 
 
  Statistics Canada estimates that in 2001, the most recent year for which data are 
available, there were 1,070 tonnes of proven gold reserves in Canada (i.e. that were 
known to exist with a high degree of certainty and that were judged to be consistent with 
profitable extraction).
18  This figure was much lower, at 493 tonnes, in 1977, implying 
that over the 1977-2001 period there was either increased proven reserves through 
exploration and new discoveries, increased commercial viability through price changes 
and the diffusion of new mining techniques, or both.  However, throughout the 1990s the 
stock of proven gold reserves declined – from a historical high of 1,801 tonnes in 1988 – 
reflecting faster growth in extraction relative to finds of new deposits.  Relative to the 
1,070 tonnes of reserves in 2001, extraction in that same year was only 158.9 tonnes 
(Chart 3).  At present extraction rates and profitability conditions, reserves are therefore 
equivalent to 6.7 years of production.  The ratio of extraction to total stock has been 
much higher in the past, with the stock equivalent to an average of 15 years of production 
in the mid-1980s. 
 
D.  Labour Force and Related Characteristics 
 
  The gold mining industry appears to have a well-educated workforce.  Labour 
Force Survey data on educational attainment are only available for the overall metal 
mining industry, which includes iron, copper and other metal mines in addition to gold 
mines.
19  However, the average years of schooling for gold miners is not likely different 
                                                 
16 Data on the foreign/domestic ownership of enterprises as well as their equity and asset holdings and 
profits were collected for all Canadian firms under the Corporations and Labour Unions Return Act for the 
1980-1988 period.  These data are available by detailed industry from Statistics Canada via CANSIM table 
179-0002.  Such data do not appear to be available beyond this period by industry. 
17 The website of Canadian Miner magazine (www.canadianminer.com) lists over 170 Canadian mining 
companies, with links to their webpages that list property holdings and operation and exploration activity in 
all types of mining, in Canada and internationally.  Two major Canadian gold mining companies are 
Barrick and Teck Cominco, both with exploration activity and operations in several countries 
internationally.  The latter is also a world leader in coal and zinc mining, with interests in refining and 
smelting as well. 
18 These estimates are taken from CANSIM Table 153-0021.  Earlier estimates were published in Statistics 
Canada (2001). 
19 Custom tabulations from the 2001 Census on educational attainment by industry are likewise not 
available to a level of industry detail beyond all metal mining.  16 
than the average for all metal mine workers, and this was about 13.03 years in 2001 
(CSLS 2003:Table 48).  This compares to 13.47 years for all Canadian workers and 12.80 
years for all (metal plus non-metal) mining workers.  Average years of schooling of metal 
miners increased by 0.6 per cent per year between 1976 and 2001, slightly higher than the 
all industries growth rate of 0.5 per cent per year.  This growth gap increased in the 1989-
2001 period, with average years of education advancing at an average annual rate of 1.4 
per cent per year over this period, relative to 1.0 per cent per year for all industries.  The 
near-average years of schooling in metal mining reflects a very high proportion of 
workers with a post-secondary certificate or diploma (43.5 per cent) but a low proportion 
of workers with a university degree (11.5 per cent). 
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  Average hourly labour compensation in the gold mining industry was $32.58 
(current dollars) in 1997, representing 167 per cent of the total economy average (CSLS 
2003:Table 35).  More recent data are not available due to greater confidentiality 
concerns with the implementation of the new North American Industry Classification 
System.  Gold mining’s above-average hourly labour compensation is consistent with that 
in metal and non-metal mining in general, with the entire mining sector at 143 per cent of 
the total economy average. 
 
  The remarkable reduction in the incidence of injuries in mining in general has 
also been experienced by metal mining specifically.
20  In 1982 there were 4,688 injuries 
in metal mining in Canada, or 8.7 per 100 workers.  This compares to 11.4 per 100 
workers in all mining and 4.3 per 100 workers in the total economy on average.  
However, by 2002 the incidence of injuries had declined sharply to 2.2 per 100 workers 
in metal mining.  The incidence of workplace fatalities has also shown a marked decline 
                                                 
20 Again, data are not available to greater industry detail beyond metal mining.  However, it is likely that 
trends for gold mining are close to the average for all metal mining.  17 
in metal mining – from 179.9 per 100,000 workers in 1993 to 125.9 per 100,000 workers 
in 2002 – but still shows a level much higher than the 6.0 per 100,000 workers at the total 
economy level. 
 
The average age of the overall mining workforce appears to be somewhat above 
that for all industries.  Based on publicly-available aggregations from the Labour Force 
Survey, the average age of employees in mining, forestry, oil and gas and fishing 
industries was about 38.3 years in 2001, compared to 37.6 years for all industries.
21  For 
the primary industries this represents a somewhat large increase, from 37.6 years in 1997.  
At the all industries level the average age of the workforce was virtually unchanged over 
the 1997-2001 period, rising just 0.3 years from 37.3 years in 1997. 
 
Data on employment by major industry and sex are also available from the 
Labour Force Survey, and show that employment in the primary industries is heavily 
male-dominated.  In 2001 males accounted for 51.6 per cent of the all industries 
workforce, down from 52.4 per cent in 1997.  For primary industries the proportion of 
males in the total workforce was much larger, at 84.1 per cent in 2001, down from 85.9 
per cent in 1997.
22 
 
  The proportion of mining employees covered by a union declined rapidly between 
1976 and 1995.  In 1976 the rate of union density was 44.3 per cent in mining, declining 
fairly steadily and reaching 24.7 per cent in 1995 (CSLS, 2003:Table 44).  Data from the 
Labour Force Survey on all primary industries excluding agriculture show a continued 
decline after 1997.  The rate of unionization remained fairly steady at the all industries 
level over 1976-1995, at between 27 and 29 per cent, and has not shown any marked 
trend since 1997 based on the Labour Force Survey data.  It is not known how well these 
average rates and trends hold for gold mining specifically. 
 
E.  Capital Intensity 
 
  Gold mines are highly capital intensive operations.  In 2000 the ratio of capital 
stock to hours worked in the gold mining industry was $669.93 per hour (1997 dollars), 
compared to just $61.69 for all industries on average (CSLS, 2003:Table 38).  Capital 
intensity also advanced much more rapidly over the 1961-2000 period in gold mining 
than in the total economy, at 5.5 per cent per year compared to 1.7 per cent per year.  
Capital intensity advanced between 1989 and 2000 by 4.3 per cent per year in gold 
mining and by 1.3 per cent per year in the total economy. 
 
  Unpublished data from the Capital Stocks Division of Statistics Canada show that 
most of the capital stock of the gold mining industry (77.1 per cent in 2002) was in 
                                                 
21 Custom Census tabulations (based on a 20 per cent sample) on average age by detailed NAICS industry 
are available for 2001 only.  For metal mining, the average age of the labour force in 2001 was 43.1 years, 
compared to 39.0 years in all industries. 
22 Custom Census tabulations (based on a 20 per cent sample) on employment by gender and detailed 
NAICS industry are available for 2001 only.  For metal mining, the proportion of males in total 
employment in 2001 was 91.1 per cent, compared to 53.1 per cent in all industries.  18 
engineering capital stock, with much smaller proportions in structures capital stock (17.6 
per cent) and machinery and equipment (5.3 per cent).  The machinery and equipment 
capital stock actually declined throughout the 1990s, while the total capital stock 
experienced slight decreases but the engineering capital stock showed slight increases.  
These declines in the machinery and equipment capital stock, driven by weak investment, 
may mean that the gold mining sector has not benefited from technological advance 
embedded in new machinery.  This, however, cannot be stated with certainty, since 
computers embody a high level of technology but are relatively inexpensive relative to 
other machinery and equipment investments.  A declining machinery and equipment 
capital stock can reflect investment in cheap but high-technology computers offsetting 
depreciation of expensive but low-technology equipment.  Also, the stronger investment 
in engineering products (which includes exploration expenditures and site development) 
may indicate that high and increasing effort is focused on searching for sites with more 
abundant deposits before mining begins, and on more efficiently extracting the deposits.  
Engineering capital also includes the roads constructed on mine sites and the actual 
construction and support of mine shafts and pits. 
 
F.  Technological and Process Developments 
 
  There have been several improvements in the mining of metals in the past several 
decades.  For some metals one of the major developments has been the extraction of 
metals from ores using solvents.  The more traditional hard-rock extraction process 
pulverizes ores containing gold and applies chemicals and heat to separate the pure gold 
from the other materials.
23  There has been much improvement in this process, for 
example developing in-pit crushers and improved methods for hauling crushed ore from 
pits, and the computerization of the handling of some processes.  One important 
innovation, mentioned in the literature review, has been the use of robotic equipment in 
the extraction process. 
 
In addition to these somewhat specific developments in gold mining, the path of 
technological progress in gold mining is likely affected by broadly the same 
technological developments as other mining industries.  For example, Gemcom, a mining 
consulting company based in Vancouver, British Columbia, has developed the GEMS 
software package for assistance with each stage of mining, from exploration to site 
planning to extraction.  Such software and consulting are of course not specific to any 
particular type of mining, but rather are mentioned here as evidence of increasing 
computerization in mining operations in general. 
 
Lonmo (2003:17) shows that the mining industry in Canada has tended to invest 
very little in research and development relative to its output compared to other industries.  
This should not be regarded as firm evidence of technological decline and failure to 
innovate though.  Most technological advance in mining happens somewhat naturally 
through the availability of improved machinery and new tools and equipment supplied by 
                                                 
23 Placer gold mining makes up a very small proportion of total gold mining.  19 
other industries, much of which is produced in other countries.
24  Further, Uhrbach and 
van Tol (2004) show that large firms – defined as those with more than 100 employees, 
which most gold and other mining operations have – virtually all use information 
technologies such as personal computers and high-speed internet access.  This suggests 
that, while groundbreaking technical advances may be difficult to identify, mining 
industries are not lagging in their innovative efforts. 
 
Indeed, a detailed study on the Canadian mining industry in general – 
commissioned by the Mining Association of Canada and prepared by Global Economics 
(2001) – finds that, despite having the image of an old-fashioned industry, the mining 
industry in Canada is actually quite dynamic and among the most intensive users of 
advanced technologies.  An earlier report by the Mining Association of Canada (1999) 
states that these technologies have focused on the use of global positioning systems in 
exploration, low-impact seismic excavation methods, underground communications 
systems, computer organization of mining activities, and internet use in procurement.  
Besides aiding the industry in adapting to global competition and uncertainty based on 
fluctuating prices and the margin of error in assaying during exploration, the report finds 
that these investments in technology have also contributed to impressive records in 
workplace safety and environmental performance. 
 
G.  Output Price 
 
  The price of gold has boomed since the 1970s, rising from $35.94U.S. per ounce 
in 1971 to $309.73U.S. in 2002 (www.kitco.com).  Although an increase of nearly nine 
times (in nominal terms), the price of gold had actually been falling through most of the 
1980s and 1990s.  On an annual basis the highest recorded price per ounce of gold 
occurred in 1980, when it reached $612.56U.S.  In real terms (i.e. deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index), the price of gold increased by about 38 per cent between 1961 
and 2002, or 0.8 per cent per year (Chart 2). 
 
H.  Regulation and Taxation 
 
  Castrilli (1999) provides a detailed discussion of regulations, especially 
environmental, facing the Canadian mining industry.  Without repeating this analysis in 
detail, it is sufficient to mention only a few limited examples.  The most significant 
regulations facing mines in terms of their effect on increasing mining costs or altering 
mining behaviour are probably those concerning the health and safety of workers, and the 
reclamation of landscape and clean-up of the site at closing.  It is, however, difficult to 
tell how these regulations would affect the costs and productivity of mining industries 
                                                 
24 Lonmo (2003) also shows that the mining industry has a high concentration of research and development, 
meaning that most R&D is performed by a limited number of firms in the industry.  Most natural resource 
industries have this same combination of high R&D concentration but low overall R&D intensity.  This is 
not necessarily detrimental, as it might be in manufacturing industries with limited inter-firm cooperation, 
since the largest mining companies with the greatest capacity to undertake research and development do so 
while smaller companies can simply buy into new innovations when they become available.  According to 
Global Economics (2001:11), Canadian corporations with mining operations that invested in R&D were, in 
descending order of the amount spent in 2000, Alcan, Noranda, Inco, Cominco and Falconbridge.  20 
relative to the regulations facing other industries in Canada or mining industries in other 
countries.  Certainly in the past few decades, after the most significant safety regulations 
were passed in the 1970s, it does not appear that regulation in the mining industry has 
increased at a faster pace than for other industries. 
 
  Statistics Canada (2001:110) provides estimates of expenditures on pollution 
abatement by industry, which can serve as a rough proxy of how environmental 
regulations affect costs under the assumption that the majority of environmental 
expenditures are motivated by regulation.  In 1997, the mining industry spent an 
estimated $66.7 million complying with environmental regulations.  This is equivalent to 
about 0.9 per cent of the current dollar value added of the mining sector.  For the overall 
business sector, expenditures on pollution control were $1,545.8 million in 1997, or about 
0.2 per cent of current dollar value added.  This suggests that the mining industry faces a 
higher regulatory burden relative to other industries.  However, it is also likely that some 
of these regulations have ultimately benefited the industry in terms of worker 
performance in a safer environment and have brought social benefits in terms of an 
improved state of the environment. 
 
  Related to innovation in the mining industry is the taxation policy facing the 
industry, since such policies affect the incentives to invest.  Brewer, Bergevin and 
Arseneau (1999) and Dahlby (1999) provide detailed reviews of the taxation policies 
facing Canadian mining industries.  Mining companies face both corporate taxes and 
resource royalties, the latter designed to capture the economic rent of mineral extraction, 
or in other words the return over and above the cost of extracting the resource.  There are, 
however, special provisions in the corporate tax code for mining industries, including 
deductibility of exploration expenses and accelerated depreciation on some capital 
investments.  Overall Dahlby (1999) finds that the taxation burden for Canadian mining 
industries is below that for other Canadian industries and comparable to that for mining 
industries in other countries.  Therefore, the Canadian taxation system does not appear to 
be impeding innovation in the mining industry.
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I.  Environmental Performance 
 
  MiningWatch Canada is a non-profit organization that expresses concern for what 
it sees as irresponsible environmental and social behaviour of mining industries.  In a 
report titled Looking Below the Surface and jointly published by MiningWatch and the 
Pembina Institute, Winfield et al. (2002) state that much waste is created in the mining 
process, including overburden and other waste from the excavation process, tailings and 
                                                 
25 An earlier study by Boadway et al. (1987) finds that some mining taxation provisions may be biasing 
investment towards exploration and development and away from other types of investment, such as 
innovation in the extraction process (although this does not conflict with the proposition that the 
disincentives to innovate are less in mining than in other Canadian industries).  They argue that a tax on 
pure profits, as opposed to the corporate tax with special provisions, would remove this distortion.  More 
recently and not specific to Canada, Andrews-Speed and Rogers (1999) also suggest that directing taxes 
only at mining companies’ profits would be best for innovation, since this would provide a joint incentive 
to companies and governments to reduce mining costs (i.e. through the adoption of new technologies and 
processes).  21 
contaminants from the ore concentration process, and air pollution during the smelting 
process.  The report is especially concerned with an apparent shift in the concerns of 
governments towards providing greater support for mining industries and away from 
supporting environmental protection. 
 
  A different view on the environmental performance of mining industries is 
expressed by the Mining Association of Canada (2003).  This annual Environmental 
Progress Report states that combined releases to air and water of eight dangerous 
substances have been significantly reduced since 1993.  For example, releases of mercury 
fell by 94 per cent, and releases of arsenic by 54 per cent.  The report also discusses 
progress on a number of projects undertaken by the mining industry to reduce emissions 
and make environmental improvements, such as the Mine Environment Neutral Drainage 
research program and the National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines Initiative. 
 
  This divergence in views is in part driven by different perspectives, the first 
judging environmental performance at a given point in time and the second judging 
improvements over time.  It is not clear what the best way to measure environmental 
performance is, but it is also not clear what the linkages are between environmental 
progress and productivity.  Increased effort spent on environmental issues not related to 
the production process will decrease productivity, but such efforts may indirectly lead to 
productivity-enhancing process improvements.  In any case, the Mining Association of 
Canada (2003) report presents convincing evidence that there have been significant 
environmental improvements in the past decade, although it is not known what degree of 
selectivity was exercised in choosing which issues to report. 
 
J.  Unemployment and Capacity Utilization 
 
The Labour Force Survey only has data on the unemployment rate by industry 
publicly available for broad industry groups.  For mining and oil and gas, the 
unemployment rate was 5.1 per cent in 2001, compared to 7.2 per cent for all industries.
26  
2001 was a recession year for the overall Canadian economy, but unemployment actually 
declined in the mining and oil and gas industry, from 5.3 per cent in 2000 and 7.9 per 
cent in 1999.  This same pattern did not hold for the recession in the early 1990s, with 
unemployment in all industries increasing from 8.1 per cent of the labour force in 1990 to 
10.3 per cent in 1991, and from 6.7 per cent in mining and oil and gas in 1990 to 8.6 per 
cent in 1991. 
 
  Capacity utilization in mining and oil and gas, which accounts for the proportion 
of available capital resources being used, was below the average for goods-producing 
industries in 2000, at 76.6 per cent relative to 85.5 per cent (CSLS, 2003:Table 43).  
However, some data are available for a more detailed industry breakdown, and show that 
for mining only the capacity utilization rate was 89.7 per cent in 2000, implying a very 
low rate of utilization for oil and gas.  Capacity utilization is strongly procyclical for both 
                                                 
26 Custom Census tabulations (based on a 20 per cent sample) on unemployment by detailed NAICS 
industry are available for 2001 only.  For metal mining, the unemployment rate in 2001 was 5.7 per cent, 
compared to 7.4 per cent in all industries.  22 
mining and all industries, falling during recessions and rising during expansions.  It is not 
known how well these average trends hold for individual mining industries. 
 
 
III.  Productivity Levels and Trends in the Gold Mining Industry in 
Canada 
 
A.  Labour Productivity 
 
  The level of output per hour in gold mining in 2000 was $82.44 per hour in 
constant 1992 dollars, slightly above the level for all mining industries of $68.13 and 
much higher than the all industries average of $28.99 per hour.  This has historically been 
the case, with the level of real output per hour in gold mining about 175 per cent that in 




  Productivity growth in gold mining is very sensitive to the period examined.  For 
example, between the 1981 and 1989 cyclical peaks, output per hour growth in gold 
mining was a strong 5.4 per cent per year.  But in the 1960s and early 1970s (1961-1973) 
growth was much weaker, at 1.9 per cent per year, and output per hour actually declined 
sharply in the 1970s (1973-1981), by 4.2 per cent per year.  These results contrast sharply 
with developments in other industries.  The 1960s were generally years of high 
productivity growth, with output per hour advancing at a 3.4 per cent average annual rate 
in all industries.  Productivity growth was also high in mining industries (4.9 per cent per 
year on average), including some other metal mining industries (e.g. 7.6 per cent per year 
in iron mining).  The 1970s were generally years of weaker productivity growth, with 
output per hour advancing by only 1.2 per cent per year in all industries.  But the strong 
negative productivity growth in gold mining (as well as other metal mines) was in general 
not experienced by other industries. 
 Chart 4: Output per Hour in the Gold Mining Industry and  
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  Output per hour growth for the 1989-2000 period was a strong 5.7 per cent per 
year in gold mining (Table 2).  This compares to 1.4 per cent per year for the total 
economy, 4.6 per cent per year for mining and 5.1 per cent per year for metal mining.  
For gold mining this represents a rebound from very weak productivity growth of 1.0 per 
cent per year for the 1989-1995 period, following the recession of the early 1990s, to an 
impressive 11.6 per cent per year for 1995-2000.  For the overall 1961-2000 period, 
output per hour growth in gold mining was above average, at 2.4 per cent per year 
compared to 1.9 per cent per year for the total economy (Chart 5). 
 
Chart 5: Output per Hour Growth in the Gold Mining 
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Table 2: Productivity Growth in the Gold Mining Industry in Canada, 1961-2000, 
compound average annual growth rates, per cent 




1961-2000  2.37  -2.96  -0.93 
1961-1973  1.86  -13.26  -7.70 
1973-1981  -4.19  -8.27  -6.71 
1981-1989  5.44  14.38  10.84 
1989-2000  5.70  1.38  3.03 
1989-1995  1.02  0.58  0.75 
1995-2000  11.59  2.35  5.83 
Source: CSLS (2003), with updates from GDP by Industry, the Labour Force Survey, and 
the Capital Stocks Division. 
 
  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001) reports that output per hour growth in gold 
and silver mining in the United States was 5.6 per cent per year over the 1990-1999 
period.  In Canada, output per hour growth in gold mining was 2.1 per cent per year for 
this same period.  However, these growth rates are very sensitive to the particular 
beginning and end years.  The 1990-1999 period leaves out strong growth in Canadian  24 
gold mining in 1990 (17.7 per cent) and 2000 (30.0 per cent).  The more important 
message is that gold mining labour productivity growth has shown a significant 
acceleration in both Canada and the United States since the second half of the 1990s, 
although it appears that this acceleration has taken place with a lag in Canada.  This may 
suggest that improved technologies or productive processes were developed in the United 
States in this period and were later adopted by Canadian gold mines.  Global Economics 
(2001:9) states that the number of troy ounces of gold produced per hour worked was 
0.33 in Canada in 2000, compared to 0.29 for the United States. 
 
B.  Capital Productivity 
 
  Output per unit of capital stock has shown strong declines in gold mining since 
1961, falling by 13.3 per cent per year in the 1960s and by 8.3 per cent per year in the 
1970s.  Capital productivity growth in all industries was 1.1 per cent per year in 1961-
1973 and -0.8 per cent per year in 1973-1981.  Capital productivity growth was strong in 
gold mining in 1981-1989, growing by 14.4 per cent per year, while output per unit of 
capital remained virtually constant in all industries over the same period.  From 1989 to 
2000 capital productivity grew by an average annual rate of 1.4 per cent per year in gold 
mining, compared to 0.1 per cent per year in all industries. 
 
  The sharp declines in gold mining capital productivity in the 1960s and 1970s 
reflect declining output at a time of rapid capital accumulation.  At the same time, hours 
worked were declining, so that capital intensity was advancing at an incredible pace (e.g. 
17.4 per cent per year in the 1960s).  This situation, in the 1960s especially, is perplexing.  
High capital intensity growth was observed with weak labour productivity growth and 
declining output, the opposite of what would be expected.  This issue will be examined in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
C.  Total Factor Productivity 
 
  Total factor productivity, like capital productivity, fell through most of the 1960s 
and 1970s in gold mining, before rebounding sharply in the 1980s and continuing with 
more moderate growth in the 1990s (Table 2).  At the total economy level, TFP growth 
was strongest in 1961-1973, falling off thereafter but remaining positive, and showing 
some signs of acceleration since the mid-1990s.  Total factor productivity growth rates 
are very sensitive to the method used to calculate the TFP index.  As was discussed 
previously, a simple Cobb-Douglas production function has been assumed, with constant 
returns to scale in capital stock and hours worked and fixed factor shares over the entire 
1961-2000 period examined. 
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IV.  Explaining Labour Productivity Trends in the Gold Mining 
Industry in Canada 
 
A.  Decomposition of Labour Productivity Growth 
 
  Following the same production function methodology briefly explained in the 
second section for total factor productivity, it is possible to decompose labour 
productivity growth into TFP growth and growth in capital intensity.  Further, capital 
intensity can be divided into the three component classifications, namely building 
construction, engineering construction and machinery and equipment.  Contributions for 
various periods are shown in Table 3 below. 
 
The table shows that the most important component of labour productivity growth 
in gold mining for the overall 1961-2000 period and the 1961-1973 period was growth in 
the capital stock per hour worked, and that the most important component of overall 
capital intensity was engineering capital intensity.  As mentioned previously, the 
engineering capital stock represents a much larger proportion (over 77 per cent) of the 
overall gold mining capital stock compared to other industries.  This appears to be driven 
by the fact that exploration activities and mine site development are included in the 
engineering capital stock.  This suggests that in the 1960s, weak labour productivity 
growth was driven by exploration and site development.  But presumably this exploration 
and development had limited success in terms of bringing high quality deposits into 
production, since output was falling in this period.  The engineering capital stock also 
includes the actual construction of mines.  The high level of engineering investment in 
this period may therefore also suggest that deeper mines were constructed in order to 
access lower quality ores since new sites with more accessible ores were not available.  
This would partially explain increased capital investment coincident with low labour 
productivity and declining output.  The engineering capital intensity became important 
for labour productivity growth again in the 1990s, but to a much lesser degree. 
 
  After 1973, labour productivity growth in gold mining was driven principally by 
total factor productivity growth.  In the 1970s, the large declines in labour productivity 
were met with even larger declines in TFP.  But the rebound in labour productivity 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s was driven by phenomenal TFP growth (10.8 per cent per 
year) in 1981-1989, and less impressive but still strong TFP growth from 1989 to 2000 
(3.0 per cent per year).  26 
 
Table 3: Average Annual Growth in Output per Hour and its Components in the Gold 


































  1) Compound Average Annual Growth Rates, per cent 
1961-2000  2.37  -0.93  5.49  4.35  6.64  1.79 
1961-1973  1.86  -7.70  17.43  16.26  19.10  14.34 
1973-1981  -4.19  -6.71  4.44  2.77  5.89  0.87 
1981-1989  5.44  10.84  -7.81  -9.96  -6.96  -9.26 
1989-2000  5.70  3.03  4.26  4.40  4.92  -1.89 
  2) Absolute Contributions to Output per Hour Growth, percentage points 
1961-2000  2.37  -0.93  3.37  0.55  2.75  0.13 
1961-1973  1.86  -7.70  10.69  2.80  6.32  1.58 
1973-1981  -4.19  -6.71  2.73  0.37  2.30  0.08 
1981-1989  5.44  10.84  -4.79  -1.17  -2.97  -0.64 
1989-2000  5.70  3.03  2.61  0.46  2.25  -0.10 
  3) Relative Contributions to Output per Hour Growth, per cent 
1961-2000  100  -39.4  142.1  23.1  116.1  5.5 
1961-1973  100  -413.7  574.4  150.5  339.5  84.9 
1973-1981  100  160.2  -65.1  -8.9  -55.0  -1.8 
1981-1989  100  199.0  -88.0  -21.5  -54.6  -11.7 
1989-2000  100  53.2  45.8  8.1  39.4  -1.7 
Source: Calculated from CSLS (2003:Tables 33 through 40) and updated with more recent 
unpublished data from Statistics Canada, Capital Stocks and GDP by Industry Divisions. 
Note: The contribution of capital intensity growth to output per hour growth is defined as 
growth in the total capital stock per hour work multiplied by capital’s share of value added 
(0.5623, from the CSLS productivity data base by industry and province).  The growth rate of 
capital per hour is the weighted average of the three components of capital divided by hours 
worked, where the weights are the average shares of each component in the total capital stock 
over each period.  Contributions do not sum exactly to totals due to rounding and the 
approximate nature of the decomposition. 
 
  One view of total factor productivity growth is that it represents the pace of 
technological advance of an industry, or at least the part of technical progress that is not 
related to new technologies embedded in the capital stock.  However, given the limited 
production function framework utilized, there is a strong possibility that several 
important factors of production have not been explicitly accounted for.  This implies that 
these other factors have been pushed into the contribution of TFP growth to output per  27 
hour growth.  For a more complete explanation of productivity trends, these other 
important factors of the production process need to be examined individually.
27 
 
B.  The Contributions of Price, Technology, Skills and Other Factors to 
Productivity Growth 
 
  Total factor productivity growth as calculated here indicates the proportion of 
output growth that is not accounted for by growth in hours worked and in capital 
accumulation.  This implies that TFP is affected by all other factors related to the 
production process, such as the skills and quality of the workforce, improvements in the 
organization of production and the technology available, compositional effects of closing 
lower productivity mines, and so on. 
 
  As discussed above, the limited evidence available suggests that the gold mining 
workforce is highly skilled.  Average years of education per worker are nearly equivalent 
to the all industries average, but this is driven by a lower proportion of workers with a 
university degree.  University degrees may not be particularly relevant for most mining 
workers since they generally do not embody skills germane to the type of labour 
traditionally required of miners.  A more relevant distinction may be post-secondary 
certificates, since colleges and trade schools are more focused on teaching applied skills 
than are universities.  The proportion of the mining workforce with a post-secondary 
certificate or diploma is above average, indicating that workers are well trained for the 
work they do.  As well, the slightly above-average age of the mining workforce may 
suggest a higher level of experience than other industries.  While there is no doubt that 
these credentials are important in maintaining the relatively high level of output per hour 
in the gold mining industry, and that their gradual growth has played a part in 
productivity growth, there is no evidence of a large erosion of skills that could explain the 
contraction in measured TFP in the 1973-1981 period. 
 
  This same observation applies in terms of technological progress as well.  It 
appears that new technologies have been adopted by mining industries through the 
gradual purchase of new equipment, and that mining techniques have evolved through a 
natural refinement and learning-by-doing process.  While integral to productivity 
improvement in the long-run, it does not appear that there have been groundbreaking 
process or technological improvements in gold production that could account for the 
spurt in TFP growth in the 1980s, nor of technical regress that might explain the negative 
TFP growth in the 1970s.  Indeed, the slow growth in the capital stock (and large declines 
in capital intensity) in the 1980s suggests that gold mines were exploiting capital 
accumulated during the high-investment years of the 1960s and 1970s, so that there were 
limited opportunities for acquiring new technologies embodied in new equipment in this 
                                                 
27 Another consequence of the limited production function utilized is that the role of capital intensity is 
likely underestimated.  Romer (1987) casts much doubt on the precision of the type of decomposition 
technique utilized here, and states that such methods probably underestimate the role of capital to a large 
degree.  Therefore, the magnitude of the capital intensity contributions in the 1980s and 1990s should not 
be regarded as wholly accurate.  However, these objections do not necessarily imply that labour 
productivity is driven entirely by capital intensity, and so do not obviate the need to examine other factors 
contributing to labour productivity growth.  28 
period.  However, the rebound in capital intensity growth in the 1990s may suggest that 




  A main driver of labour productivity growth in gold mining – mentioned but not 
analyzed in CSLS (2003) – appears to be changes in the real price of gold.  The inverse 
relationship between these two variables is shown in Chart 6, which shows declining 
labour productivity in 1973-1981 coincident with increases in the real price of gold, and 




  As discussed in the literature review, the relationship between the real price of 
gold and gold mining productivity is that increases in the price of gold lead to 
unfavourable compositional shifts as mines that were previously unprofitable (due, for 
example, to poorer quality ores) begin production since the output can then fetch a higher 
price.  These newly opened mines will have lower productivity due to the increased effort 
required to draw gold from the lower quality ores, lowering the productivity of the 
overall industry. 
 
  Certainly in the 1990s this hypothesis is confirmed with data on the number of 
gold mining establishments.  Between 1989 and 2001 the number of gold mines in 
operation in Canada was cut in half, from 70 to 35, as the real price of gold fell by 46 per 
cent.  During the 1970s, as the price of gold began a sharp increase ending in 1980, the 
number of establishments stayed relatively constant rather than increasing as would be 
                                                 
28 Capital intensity growth in the 1990s was actually driven primarily by large decreases in employment 
and hours worked, with the capital stock showing slight declines.  But this does not disprove the 
proposition that output per hour growth was driven by investment in computers in the 1990s.  Investment in 
computer systems may have substituted for investment in more expensive machinery, and further, 
computerized operations may have enabled the production of more ore with fewer hours of work to a larger 
degree than more conventional machinery would have. 
 Chart 6: Output per Hour in Gold Mining and the Real  
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Source: Output per Hour from CSLS (2003:Table 33) and unpublished GDP by Industry data.  Gold prices from 
www.kitco.com, deflated with the CPI.  29 
expected.  However, the declining gold mining labour productivity of this period suggests 
that existing establishments began operations on sites with poorer quality mining 
conditions. 
 
  But the price effect may still only be part of the story.  The fact that the number of 
gold mining establishments stayed fairly constant during a period of price increases 
suggests that the general quality of deposits was declining during this period.  
Compositional shifts can entail new mines opening on lower quality sites, which leads to 
increases in output since the high quality mines still stay in operation.  But in the 1970s it 
appears that the lower quality of sites reflects more simply an unavailability of high 
quality sites, as output was actually falling.  It is therefore possible that, had the real price 
of gold not increased in the 1970s, gold mining would have shut down in Canada as the 
grade of ores seems to have been diminishing and profitability at a constant price would 
eventually have been exhausted. 
 
In turn, the rebound in output and productivity growth in gold mining after 1981 
suggests either that new high-quality reserves were eventually discovered, or that the 
years of poor growth in the 1970s prompted some sort of change in work rules or 
innovation in process.  Data on the proven reserves of gold in Canada from Statistics 
Canada show that additions to the stock (i.e. new discoveries) outpaced extraction by a 
wide margin in 1983-1988, confirming that there was a large increase in the amount of 
reserves consistent with profitable extraction during this period.  This is consistent with 
the large Hemlo discovery in northwestern Ontario in 1980, which stimulated further 
exploration.  The literature review discussed the overhaul in the organization of work in 
iron mines in Canada and the United States in the 1980s, and it was also suggested there 
that such reorganization probably took place in copper mines as well.  It is therefore also 
quite likely that changing work rules in terms of broadening the tasks that can be 
assigned to individual workers had an impact on labour productivity in Canadian gold 
mining as well.  The continued success of the industry after the 1980s probably owes 
much to the discovery of high quality deposits and the development of new techniques in 
more efficiently extracting gold from lower quality ores. 
 
C.  Summary of Labour Productivity Determinants by Decade 
 
  Based on these observations, the following proximate drivers of productivity 
growth in the Canadian gold mining industry have been identified. 
 
·  1960s: rapid growth in capital intensity but declining output and only weak labour 
productivity growth, due to declining ore grades. 
 
·  1970s: a large increase in the real price of gold encouraged the mining of poor 
quality sites, leading to large declines in labour productivity – but the continued 
declines in output suggest that as much gold as possible was being extracted from 
existing operations, and perhaps that the high prices saved the industry from 
collapse. 
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·  1980s: an abrupt rebound to solid labour productivity growth, due to new 
discoveries of richer and more accessible deposits, reinforced by technological 
and organizational improvements. 
 
·  1990s: weak productivity growth in the first half of the decade followed by very 
strong growth thereafter.  Capital intensity growth became important once again 
after stagnation in the 1980s, a steady decline in the real price of gold continued 
to pressure low-productivity mines to close, and more importantly, most aspects 
of mining – from site design to extraction to the on-site transportation of materials 





  On average the gold mining industry in Canada has shown a strong productivity 
performance over the past four decades, although this performance has varied by decade.  
For the past two decades, growth in output per hour has been very strong, exceeding the 
total economy average by a wide margin.  But in the 1960s, growth was comparatively 
weak, and the 1970s witnessed sharp declines in gold mining labour productivity. 
 
  In general, the labour productivity performance of gold mining is capital driven.  
Increased effort in locating sites with abundant reserves of high-quality ores – captured in 
the engineering capital stock – can have a large payoff in terms of increased efficiency in 
the extraction of gold.  Engineering capital intensity, which is driven in part by 
exploration activity, has historically been quite high in gold mining.  Growth in total 
capital intensity has been strong in most periods, except in the 1980s when it was 
possible to exploit the stock that had been rapidly built up in the 1960s and 1970s with 
little replacement.  In the 1990s, capital intensity growth, driven by declines in hours of 
work and slow growth in the capital stock, likely embodied important technological 
developments, including the computerization of mine operations. 
 
  In recent decades, however, the contribution of capital intensity to labour 
productivity growth has been eclipsed by those of other factors, the most important of 
which appear to be the price of gold and declining ore grades.  The productivity declines 
in the 1970s and the strong rebound in the 1980s and 1990s have been accompanied first 
by sharp increases in the CPI-deflated price of gold and second by steady declines in this 
price after the peak in 1980.  Especially in the 1990s, the low and falling real price of 
gold appears to have given lower-productivity mines an incentive to close, leaving only 
the most productive mines in operation.  In the 1970s the rising price of gold was 
coincident with the mining of lower quality sites, that is, a shift towards unfavourable 
inefficient production.  Increased effort was necessary to extract a given amount of gold 
from these poor quality and formerly unprofitable mine sites.  The decline in ore grades 
was mostly to blame for this situation though, with the rising real price merely allowing 
the less efficient operations to remain profitable. 
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  It is likely then that the increasing real price of gold in the 1970s made the 
survival of the gold mining industry possible.  This has turned out to be fortunate, as the 
industry has made large contributions to aggregate labour productivity growth since the 
1980s.  This turnaround from the performance of the 1970s was possibly driven at first by 
the adoption of work rules that allowed workers to perform tasks more fluidly.  Later in 
that decade, with output and productivity advancing at an above-average pace, the 
importance of these new work rules was likely offset by the discovery of new deposits or 
the development of more efficient techniques for extracting gold from lower quality ores. 
 
  It is also important to stress once again the high quality of the gold mining 
workforce and the role that these skilled workers have played in maintaining the level of 
output per hour in gold mining much above the average for all industries.  Despite some 
evidence of limited research and development effort, the passive technological advance in 
the gold mining industry appears to be serving the industry well in terms of labour 
productivity growth.  From this perspective, it would not seem a fruitful approach to 
provide additional incentives for independent research and development within the 
mining industry, although neither should such efforts be discouraged.  R&D within 
sectors producing equipment used by the mining industry can have a potentially large 
impact on mining productivity growth, especially in combination with incentives to 
invest in the most up-to-date equipment available coupled with training programs in the 
effective use of such new equipment. 
 
  The large role played by the price of gold in gold mining labour productivity 
makes direct policy suggestions difficult – since the price of gold lies outside the 
influence of anything but international regulatory intervention – but a general lesson can 
be drawn.  This is simply that the price of gold does indeed have an impact on the 
decisions of mining companies.  As the price of gold rises – which it appears to be doing 
recently, although it is difficult to separate short-term movements from long-term trends 
– mining companies will turn to lower quality mining sites where more effort is needed to 
extract gold.  This will have negative implications for the productivity of the industry 
overall, but productivity need not be the only or even primary concern.  To the extent that 
an exploitable opportunity for profit exists where none existed before, the benefits 
created by this profit may outweigh the lower contribution made to aggregate 
productivity and well-being by the gold mining industry.  However, it may be the case 
that the greater effort required to mine lower quality sites leads to a less safe working 
environment for miners or to greater environmental harm.  In general it would seem 
beneficial to encourage gold mining companies to exploit the highest quality reserves 
known to exist before moving on to lower quality reserves, although the higher profit 
available from better quality reserves provides an incentive for this behaviour in any case. 
 
  This leads to a last important point, namely the role of new exploration techniques 
in identifying the highest quality sites and in finding new reserves.  Computer-driven and 
other enhanced mapping and exploration methods can directly contribute to the 
productivity of the gold and other mining industries through the identification of the 
richest and most easily exploitable reserves. 
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